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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Hopkins appeals from the district court's
affirming the magistrate's judgment of conviction entered upon the jury verdict
finding Hopkins guilty of misdemeanor malicious injury to property.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
While attending her brother's sentencing hearing, Hopkins became angry
in response to the court's sentence and shouted that she would break her brother
out of jail and that the sentence was "bullshit." (Trial Tr., p.96, L.8 - p.97, L.2,
p.111, L.14 - p.112, L.9, p.119, L.25 - p.121, L.16, p.146, Ls.5-7.)

Hopkins

stormed out of the courtroom, grabbing the courtroom door in the process and
forcefully opening it, which "completely pushed" the doorstop into the wall and
caused a hole in the wall that was the size of a soccer ball. (Trial Tr., p.97, L.3 p.99, L.17, p.112, L.15 - p.113, L.17, p.121, L.17 - p.123, L.21.)

When

interviewed by law enforcement, Hopkins apologized, admitted she left the
courtroom angry and opened the door in a "rush," but denied any intention

to

damage any property. (Trial Tr., p.130, Ls.4-24, p.135, L.16 - p.137, L.4.)
The state charged Hopkins with misdemeanor malicious injury to property.
(R., pp.6-7.) Hopkins pied not guilty and the case proceeded to trial at which the
jury found her guilty of the charged offense.

(R., pp.13, 24-26, 50.)

The

magistrate entered judgment imposing fines and costs and ordering Hopkins to
pay restitution, perform community service, and attend anger management. (R.,
p.51.) Hopkins filed a timely notice of appeal to the district court. (R., pp.56-58.)

1

On intermediate appeal, Hopkins asserted (1) the magistrate erred in
denying her request for an instruction on misfortune or accident, and (2) there
was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.

(R., p.82.) The district

court affirmed the magistrate's judgment and Hopkins filed a timely notice of
appeal to this Court. (R., pp.109-121.)

2

ISSUES
Hopkins states the

on appeal as:

Did the
court err when it failed to instruct the jury on
defense of misfortune or accident?
11.

Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Ms. Hopkins had the requisite intent to maliciously
injure or destroy the property of another?

(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Hopkins failed to show error in the district court's decision
affirming the magistrate's denial of Hopkins' request for a jury instruction on
accident or misfortune?
2.
Has Hopkins failed to show the district court erred in concluding
there was sufficient evidence to support Hopkins' conviction for malicious injury
to property?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Hopkins Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion That
Hopkins Was Not Entitled To A Jury Instruction On Misfortune Or Accident

Introduction

A.

Hopkins asserts "the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the
defense of misfortune or accident thereby depriving her of her constitutional
rights." (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Hopkins' instructional error claim fails. Based on
the evidence presented and the instructions given, Hopkins cannot show error in
the district court's conclusion that the magistrate did not err in declining Hopkins'
request for an instruction on accident or misfortune.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."

kl

"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s]
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure."

kl

(citing Losser, 145

Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137
(1981)).
4

a jury was properly instructed. State v.
4, 430 (2009) (citing Miller v. State,
261,

C.

, 16 P.

(Ct. App. 2000)).

The District Court Correctly Concluded Hopkins Was Not Entitled To A
Jury Instruction On Misfortune Or Accident
After the state rested, Hopkins requested the court to instruct the jury on

the defense of "misfortune or accident." (Trial Tr., p.138, Ls.14-16, p.139, L.16p.140, L.11.)

The state objected and the magistrate reserved ruling until the

defense presented its case in chief; however, the magistrate indicated it did not
"believe the evidence up [to that] point support[ed] the instruction." (Trial Tr.,
p.138, L.19 - p.139, L.12, p.140, Ls.12-23.) At the conclusion of the defense's
case, which was limited to Hopkins' testimony admitting she angrily left the
courtroom, the magistrate "sustain[ed]" the state's objection to the requested
instruction. (Trial Tr., p.152, L.24 - p.153, L.3.)
On intermediate appeal, the district court affirmed the magistrate's
decision that Hopkins' request for an instruction on action or misfortune was not
warranted. (R., pp.110-117.) The district court was correct.
A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction that is an erroneous
statement of the law, is not supported by the evidence, is an impermissible
comment on the evidence or is adequately covered by other instructions. A party
is entitled to a requested jury instruction only if it is "correct and pertinent."
Severson, 147 Idaho at 710, 215 P.3d at 430 (citing l.C. § 19-2132).

An

instruction does not meet the "correct and pertinent" standard if it is an incorrect

5

statement of the law, is adequately covered by other instructions, is not
facts of the case, or if it impermissibly comments on the

supported

Severson, 1

at

11, 215

3d at 430-431; State v.

Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 510, 129 P.3d 1258, 1260 (Ct App. 2005). "In order to
determine whether the defendant's proposed instruction should have been given,
this Court must examine the instructions that were given and the evidence that
was adduced at trial."

~

at 881, 736 P.2d at 1335. To be reversible error, any

error in the jury instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the
complaining party.

State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089

(1998).
The pattern jury instruction on the defense of misfortune or accident
reads:

"All persons are capable of committing crimes, except those who

committed the act or made the omission charged through misfortune or by
accident when it appears that there was not evil design, intention or culpable
negligence."

ICJI 1508.

The instruction is based on I.C. § 18-201, which

provides, in relevant part, that "[a]II persons are capable of committing crimes"
except those "who committed the act or made the omission charged, through
misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was not evil design,
intention or culpable negligence." I.C. § 18-201 (3). The accident or misfortune
defense "is a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state
necessary to make his actions a crime." State v. Dolsby 143 Idaho 352, 354, 145
P.3d 917, 919 (Ct. App. 2006).

6

on accident or misfortune "should have

Hopkins contends an

a reasonable view

governing

given ... because it properly

theory

would support

the

more

requested instruction was not addressed adequately by other jury instructions."
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Hopkins' "legal theory" was that although she "intended
to open the door forcefully," she did not intend to cause damage and because the
damage was an accident, the magistrate should have given the requested
instruction. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11.) Hopkins is incorrect.
The magistrate correctly instructed the jury on the elements the state was
required to prove in order for it to find Hopkins guilty of malicious injury to
property. (R., p.45.) The elements instruction included a definition of the intent
required, which was that Hopkins "maliciously injured real property."

1

(R., p.45.)

Hopkins' testimony that she did not intend to do damage when she "intended to
open the door forcefully," does not entitle her to an accident or misfortune
instruction because, by her own admission, the act she committed was not
accidental. The Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 129
P.3d 1258 (Ct. App. 2005), is instructive.

1

The definition of "maliciously" given to the jury was identical to the definition
included in ICJI 1302, the pattern instruction for malicious injury to property.
However, since Hopkins' conviction and while her appeal has been pending, the
Idaho Supreme Court issued an opinion holding that the definition of "maliciously"
as stated in ICJI 1302 is incorrect. State v. Skunkcap, 2014 WL 2726932 *7
(June 17, 2014 Idaho). In Skunkcap, the Court held that the word "maliciously,"
as used in the malicious injury to property statute, I.C. § 18-7001(1), "means an
intent to damage the property without a lawful excuse for doing so." Skunkcap at
*8. The word "maliciously" as used in I.C. § 18-7001 (1) "is not intended to
protect against the merely negligent or accidental injury to property." kl at *7.
7

In Macias, the defendant was charged with aggravated battery. 142 Idaho
509, 129 P.3d at 1258. The charge was the result of injuries caused to the
when Macias

the victim.

510, 129 P.3d at 1259.

"Macias

requested the instruction regarding misfortune or accident to support one of his
defense theories, that although he came into physical contact with the victim, he
did so without the mental element-intent or willfulness-required for the
commission of battery." 1.9..c According to Macias, he believed his contact with
the victim was "necessary in order to block a blow coming from the victim," but he
did not make contact with the victim "with the purpose of using force or violence
on the victim or with the intent to strike or cause bodily harm to [him]." 1.9..c at 511,
129 P.3d at 1260. The Court of Appeals found no reversible error in the failure to
give the requested instruction because the elements instructions given by the
trial court "sufficiently notified the jury that Macias could not be found guilty for
acts committed through misfortune or accident." Macias, 142 Idaho at 511, 129
P.3d at 1260. As such, "Macias could, consistent with the given instructions,
argue his theory of the case." 1.9..c
As in Macias, the elements instruction in this case was all that was
required. There is no question that Hopkins' act of angrily opening the courtroom
door was intentional and not accidental. That she claims the resulting damage
was not intended does mean the act was accidental - clearly it was not. Further,
the instructions given did not prevent Hopkins from presenting her defense
theory and arguing that the state failed to meet its burden of proof based on her
claim that the damage she caused was unintended.

8

As such, the magistrate

correctly rejected Hopkins' request for an instruction on accident or misfortune
and Hopkins has failed to show error in the district court's order affirming that
decision.

II.
Hopkins Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That
There Was Sufficient Evidence From Which The Jury Could Find Hopkins
Guilty Of Malicious Injury To Property
A.

Introduction
Hopkins asserts "there was insufficient evidence to convict her of

malicious injury to property" because, she argues, "she lacked the requisite intent
to maliciously injure or destroy the property of another." (Appellant's Brief, p.11
(emphasis original).) The district court correctly rejected Hopkins' claim because
the state presented substantial, competent evidence from which the jury could
find Hopkins maliciously injured property when she intentionally "open[ed] the
door forcefully" as she stormed out of the courtroom in anger.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon

a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
9

State v. Knutson, 121

Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d at
1072.

Moreover, the facts,

construed in favor of upholding

inferences to be drawn from those facts, are
jury's verdict.

State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho

698, 701, 946 P .2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P .2d
at 1072.

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded There Was Sufficient Evidence To
Support The Jury's Verdict
Hopkins contends the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction

for malicious injury to property. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-14.) Although Hopkins
concedes "[i]t was clear on all accounts that [she] intended to forcefully open the
door because she was angry and upset at the sentence that her brother had
received," she argues "[t]here was no substantial evidence upon which the jury
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that [she] intentionally put a hole in
the wall of the courthouse." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) The district court correctly
rejected this claim, stating:
. . . [A]II of the witnesses who testified, including Ms. Hopkins,
testified that she was angry about the sentence her brother
received, when she left the courtroom, yelling "this is bullshit," and
she pushed the door in the wall with such force that it left a hole the
size of a soccer ball and embedded the door stop into the wall. ...
Sufficient evidence was presented at trial to justify a determination
that Ms. Hopkins was guilty of malicious injury to property, beyond
a reasonable doubt.
(R., pp.117-118.)
In reaching this conclusion, the district court recognized that "culpability for
malicious injury to property" requires the "intent to injure the property of another."

10

(R., p.117 (citing State v. Skunkcap, 2013 WL 2714563 *3 (Ct. App)2.)

That

intent can be "manifested by the commission of the acts and surrounding
circumstances with the offense." (R., p.117 (quoting I.C. § 18-115).) It was well
within the jury's purview to reject Hopkins' claim that the damage she caused
was accidental and find, based upon the surrounding circumstances, including
Hopkins' admissions that she purposely and "forcefully" threw the door open in
anger, that Hopkins did, in fact, intend to injure courthouse property. Compare
State v. Doe, 2014 WL 4086142 **14-15 (Idaho App. 2014) (even accepting
Doe's claim that he had "cathartic intent" when he overturned the refrigerator,
there was still substantial evidence from which the jury could find Doe intended to
damage the refrigerator, which evidence included testimony that Doe acted out of
rage and Doe's admission that "he knew what he did was wrong"). Hopkins has
therefore failed to show error in the district court's determination that the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict finding Hopkins guilty of
malicious injury to property.

2

The Skunkcap case cited by the district court was the Court of Appeals' opinion
that preceded the Supreme Court's opinion on review. The portion of the Court
of Appeals' opinion upon which the district court relied is consistent with the
Idaho Supreme Court's holding on review that "maliciously" as used in I.C. § 187001 (1) "means an intent to damage the property without a lawful excuse for
doing so." Skunkcap, 2014 WL 2726932 *9.
11

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
decision affirming the judgment entered upon the jury verdict finding Hopkins
guilty of malicious injury to property.
DATED this 10th day of September, 2014.

JE8i~~~t M. LORELLO
Dep(;Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of September, 2014, served
two true and correct copies of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by placing
the copies in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
HEIDI M. JOHNSON
Ada County Public Defender's Office
200 W. Front Street, Ste. 1107
Boise, ID 83702
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